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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\ 
WILLIAM L. BEEZLEY, 
R~aintiff aJnAd A pp~ellamt, 
-vs.- Case No. 8287 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEF·ENDANT AND· RESPONDENT 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
The statement made by appellant under the heading 
STATEMENT OF F\ACTS is so brief that the Court 
will find it difficult, if not impossible, from such state-
ment to ascertain just what is the basis for the trial 
court's ruling awarding defendant and respondent a 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
It is, therefore, deemed necessary to state in greater 
detail than is contained in appellant's brief, the ad-
mitted facts upon which the court below made the order 
complained of. 
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At the time and times complained of by the plain-
tiff and appellant, there was pending in the Third Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County ·a p-roceeding for divorce 
brought by Ella H. Beezley, the daughter of the defend-
ant herein, against William L. Beezley, the plaintiff 
herein. It is so alleged in plaintiff's complaint (R. 1 
and 2) and admitted in defendant's Answer (R. 3-7). 
In that ·divorce proceeding the plaintiff in this ac-
tion made the defendant herein a third party defendant. 
(See Excerpt from Dep·osition of Elias Hansen, certi-
fied to by Lois P. Crowder, R. 20-25). 
In the above mentioned divorce proceeding the 
plaintiff herein filed a Counterclaim in which he sought 
to have awarded to him an interest in an apartment 
house located at 150 South 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The title to the apartment house stood in the na1nes of 
this defendant and his daugh~er, Ella H. Beezley, and 
the plaintiff herein was by his Counterclaim attempting 
to establish in himself a one-half of the interest which 
Ella H. Beezley held in said apartment house. Plaintiff 
herein, according to the affidavits of the defendant here-
in and Ella H. Beezley, which are not denied, sought 
to establish his right to such interest in the apartment 
house at 150 South 7th East because, as he ·claimed, he 
had paid the purchase price of a Harrison Avenue home 
and the title thereto taken in his name and the name of 
his wife, Ella H. Beezley. It is further made to appear 
by the affidavits of the defendant and his daughter, 
Ella H. Beezley, that when the plaintiff herein made 
the claim that he paid the whole of the purchase price 
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of the Harrison Avenue property his wife, Ella H. Beez-
ley, requested the defendant herein to attempt to· find 
the checks which he had given her in payment of an 
obligation which he, defendant herein, had owed to his 
daughter, Ella H. Beezley, and which she claimed she 
had paid on the purchase price of the Harrison A venue 
property. That in the course of the conversation about 
such checks, the defendant herein, in substance, stated 
to his daughter, Ella H. Beezley that, "if he (plaintiff 
herein) were honest, he would admit that you paid that 
money on the property". (R. 23). Apparently the plain-
tiff herein had acquired information that defendant had 
made such a statement to his wife, Ella H. Beezley, 
because when the deposition of the defendant herein 
was taken the plaintiff herein examined the defendant 
with respect thereto. (See excerpt of deposition of Elias 
Hansen, certified to by Lois P. Crowder, Notary Public, 
R. 21-25). The statement made by the defendant to hi8 
daughter above mentioned forms· the basis of one of 
plaintiff's claims that he is, by reason thereof, entitled 
to damages in the sum of $50,000.00. The other basis 
for such claim is the fact that in answer to question8 
asked the defendant herein by the plaintiff herein during 
the course of taking defendant's deposition, he gave the 
answer above quoted. 
It is further made to appear by the affidavits of 
the defendant herein and Ella H. Beezley that when 
she concluded to bring an action for a divorce from her 
husband, William L. Beezley, the plaintiff herein, she 
sought the advice of the d~_fendant herein; that the de-
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fendant advised her that it would be in1proper for hun 
to· represent her in court, but he would advise her with 
respect to her action. In one of the pleadings filed by 
the plaintiff herein in the divorce proceedings filed by 
his wife, he alleges that his wife is the daughter of a 
lawyer, who has advised her legally during all of the 
times herein mentioned. (R. 37) However, in his reply 
filed in this action, plaintiff denies that defendant has 
acted in the capacity of attorney for Ella H. Beezley 
and that J. Grant Iverson was her attorney. 
Interrogatories were served upon the plaintiff here-
in. Among the questions asked in the Interrogatories 
so served and the answers given are the following: 
"1. Where in Salt Lake County was the de-
fendant, Elias Hansen, when it is alleged in plain-
tiff's complaint that on or about July 17, 1953 
the defendant stated concerning the plaintiff: 
''That guy isn't honest and that if he were honest, 
he would admit that she paid that money on the 
property." 
Answer : Had no occasion to keep track of 
defendants' whereabouts and therefore knew no-
thing as to defendants' location. 
2. What are the names of all persons who 
were present at the time the defendant is alleged 
to have made the statements set out in the fore-
going Interrogatory No. 1. 
Answer. ·Am unable to state at this time, 
but Ella H. Beezley to whom the statement was 
published can give you the desired infor1nation." 
It will be noted that in the Affidavit of Elias Hansen 
(R. 16-19) and in the Affidavit of Ella H. Beezley (R. 
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26-27), it is avered that at the time the defendant made 
the statement about which plaintiff herein complains, 
there was no one present other than the defendant here-
in and his daughter, Ella H. Beezley. 
Upon the record thus made in the Court below, the 
judgment on the pleadings was properly granted for the 
following reasons : 
POINT ONE 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF PRAYED OR TO 
ANY RELIEF. 
POINT TWO 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATE-
MENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA 
H. BEEZLEY, RELATIVE TO THE LACK OF HONESTY OF 
THE PLAINTIFF WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED, BE-
CAUSE OF THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 
POINT THREE 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATE-
MENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, 
ELLA H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE 
WITH HER TO BE PRODUCED IN HER DIVORCE PRO-
CEEDING WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS TO BE A WITNESS IN SUCH 
PROCEEDING. 
POINT FOUR 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATE-
MENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA 
H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE WITH HER 
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TO BE PRO·DUCED IN HER DIVO·R,CE PROCEEDINGS 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN WERE ABSOLUTELY 
PRIVILEGED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS 
A THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT IN SAID.DIVORCE ACTION. 
POINT FIVE 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE AN-
SWERS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT HEREIN TO THE 
QUESTIONS ASKED HIM BY THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN 
IN TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE DEFENDANT ON 
O·R ABOUT JANUARY 9, 1954 WERE ABSO·LUTELY PRIVI-
LEGED BECAUSE SUCH ANSWERS WERE GIVEN IN A 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND PLAINTIFF REQUESTED 
SUCH ANSWERS. 
POINT SIX 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE STATE-
MENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED. 
ARGUMENT 
Before taking up a discussion of the foregoing 
points, it may be well to direct the attention of the Court 
to the distinction made by the authorities between con-
ditional privileged communication and absolute privil-
eged communications: 
U.C .. A. 1953, 76-40-8 provides: 
''A communication made to persons interested 
in the communication by one who is also inter-
ested or who stands in such relation to the former 
as· to afford a reasonable ground for supposing 
his motive innocent is not presumed to be mali-
cious and is a privileged communication." 
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Among the cases dealing with conditional privileged 
communications from this jurisdiction are: Hales v. 
Commercial Barnk of Spanish Fork, 114 Utah 186; 197 
Pac (2d) 910; Williams v. Standard E;na1niner Pub. Co. 
83 Ut. 31, 27 Pac (2d) 1; Spielberg v. A. Kuhn arnd Bros. 
39 Utah 276; 116 Pac 1027; Malouf v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. 75 Utah 175, 192, 283 Pac.1065. 
It will be noted in the last case just cited the ques-
tion was raised as to the sufficiency of the complaint to 
state a cause of action beeause of its being faulty ~as to 
its allegations as to the injury complained of having 
been sustained concerning the business of the plaintiff. 
The rule is there recognized that in the absence of a 
slander per se, it must be made to appear that the com-
munication complained of must be concerning the busi-
ness of the plaintiff. The rule there recognized and dis-
cussed is thus stated in 33 Am. J'ur. 70, Sec. 50, where 
it is said: 
"Thus· to accuse a person orally of cheating 
or of being a cheat, rascal, swindler, blackleg or 
the like is not actionable unless special damage 
is shown; or the charge is made of a person in 
connection with his occupation or with refer-
ence to· his method of carrying on business." 
· While the question of absolute immunity from lia-
bility for spoken words which may be slanderous was 
not involved in the case of Williams v. Ogden Standard 
Examiner Publ. Co., supra, the court recognized the ex-
istence of such doctrine. On page 58 of the Utah report 
(83 Utah) it is said that there are t\vo classes of pri-
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v.il~~~d _comrp.unications (1) _absolute p-rivilege. ~d (2) 
qualified or conditional privilege. In the case of absolute 
p~ivileged communication "the utteranc~ or publication 
although both false and m~alicious does not give rise to 
a cause of action". The same classification is made by 
the authorities generally. In defining. privileged com-
munications, it is said in 33 Am. J ur. page 123, Sec. 125: 
"An absolutely privileged communication is 
one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion 
on which, or the matter in refe-rence to which it 
is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, 
however hard it may bear upon a person who 
claims to be injured thereby, and even though it 
may have been made maliciously. . . . The pri-
vilege is not intended so much for the protection 
of those engaged in the public service and in the 
enactment and administr:ation of law, as for the 
promotion of the public welfare, the p·urpose being 
that members of the legislature, judges of courts, 
JUrors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their 
minds freely and exercise their respective func-
tions without incurring the risk of a .criminal 
prosecution or an action for the recovery of dam-
ages." 
Even if, contrary to our contention, the language 
complained of could, under some circumstances, give 
rise to an action for shinder, the facts in this case makes 
th~ commu~ication here involved absolutely privileged. 
POINT ONE 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF PRAYED OR TO 
ANY RELIEF. 
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In a,ppellant's brief on page 3 thereof under para-
graph 2, 3 and 4, it is said that the words spoken to 
plaintiff's wife injured ·and damaged plaintiff in his 
profession and occupation, destroyed the confidence in 
plaintiff, and charged plaintiff with embezzlement and 
fraudulently appropriating money entrusted to him. 
By no stretch of the language complained of can the 
same be said to convey the meaning contended for in the 
appellant's brief. It is quite apparent that plaintiff had 
lost the confidence of his wife in that she had brought 
a suit against him for a divorce. It was the wife of the 
plaintiff who charged him with falsely making the claim 
that she had not contributed towBtrds the purchase of the 
Harrison Ave. property. She it was who sought the aid 
of the defendant herein to establish such fact by trying 
to find the cancelled checks that she gave to the plain tiff 
herein to apply on the purchase price of the Harrison 
Ave. property. The language complained of did not 
charge the plaintiff with appropriating the money to a 
purpose other than that for which it was intended to b·e 
used. Quite the contrary, the language complained of 
tended to show that the money had actually been used 
for the intended purpose, but the plaintiff denied that 
it had bee~ so used. Nor did the fact that the plaintiff 
denied that his wife had contributed to the purchase of 
the Harrison Avenue property even remotely have any 
bearing upon the occupation or profession of the plain-
tiff. If there was anyone who knew or should kno'\\--
what was done with the money which the defendant paid 
to his daughter, it was she. It is obvious that by the 
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defendant saying that if the p·laintiff were honest he 
would admit that his wife had paid the money. on the 
Harrison Avenue: property did not relate to plaintiff's 
manner of doing business. The most that can be said of 
such language is that the defendant believed that his 
daughter spoke the truth when she said that she applied 
the money paid to her by the.defendant on the purchase 
price of the p.roperty. It is, of course, elementary that 
to recover damages for. slander the words spoken must 
have naturally and proximately injured the person con~ 
cerning which such words were spoken. Kuhne v. Ahlers, 
92 N.Y.S. 41. The plaintiff could not have been damaged 
merely because the defendant .told his daughter that.she 
spoke the -truth. 
P,OINT TWO 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATE-
MENTS·MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA 
H. BEEZLEY, RELATIVE, T_O THE LACK OF HO·NESrY.OF 
THE PLAINTIFF WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED, BE-
CAUSE OF THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 
We have a. statute U.C.A. 1953 7.8-24-8 which pro.-
vides that: 
"There are particular relations in which it is 
the policy. of .the law to encourage c'onfidence and 
to presume· it inviolate.· Therefore a. person can-
not be examined as' a' witness in. the following 
cases: * ·* *·~. *· (2) An attorney cannot; without 
the consent of. ·his client be examined .as to any 
communication. made by the client to him, or .his 
advice given therein, in the course of professional 
employment." · 
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Apparently in this ease the plaintiff acquired the 
inforn1ation from his wife as to the observations made 
by the defendant concerning the honesty of the plaintiff. 
However, if communications had by an attorney with 
his client is to be inviolate as by law provided, it would 
seem obvious that the client may not render the attorney 
liable in damages by revealing what the attorney has 
told the client in the course of his employment. In this 
connection it may be observed that the mere fact that 
the attorney serves without compensation does not af-
fect the relation of attorney and client. Mark v. Sharp, 
138 Mich 448; 101 N.W. 631. Communications had be-
tween attorney and client are, by the ~authorities gener-
ally, held to be absolutely privileged. The law in such 
particular is thus stated in Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, Vol 3, Sec. 586, pages 229·-230: 
"An attorney at law is absolutely privileged 
to publish false and defamatory matter of an-
.other in communications preliminary to a pro-
posed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of 
or during the course and as part of a judicial pro-
ceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it 
has some relation thereto; (a) The privilege 
stated in this section is based upon public policy 
of securing to ·attorneys as officers of the court 
the utmost freedo1n in their efforts to secure jus-
tice for their clients. Therefore, the privilege is 
absolute. It protects the attorney from liability 
in an action for defan1ation. irrespective of his 
purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his 
belief in its truth or even his knowledge of its 
falsity. These matters are of importance only in 
determining the amenability of the attorney to 
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the disciplinary power of the court of \vhich he 
is an officer. The publication of defamatory mat-
ter by an attorney is protected not only when 
made in the institution of the proceedings or in 
the conduct of litigation before a judicial tribunal, 
but in conference and other communications pre-
liminary ther·eto. The institution of a judicial 
proceeding includes all pleadings and affidavits 
necessary to set the judicial machinery in motion. 
The conduct of the litigation includes the exa-
mination and cross-examination of witnesses, 
comments upon the evidence and argument, both 
oral and written, upon the evidence whether made 
to court or jury." 
Among the numerous adjudicated 'Cases where such 
doctrine is applied are the following: Zern v. Cu.llam, 
63 N.Y. S. (2d) 439; Rogers v. Thompson;, 88 N.J. Law 
639, 99 Atl 389; Lang v. Miller, 70 N.E. 128; Reed v. 
Thomas, 99 Cal. App. 719·; 279 Pac. 226. Additional 
cases to the same effect are collected in Note 4 of 33 
Am. Jur, page 116. The cases so collected contain num-
erous other cases, some of which hold that a pleading 
filed in a cause is absolutely privile_ged. That being so 
it necessarily follows th·at evidence given in support of 
a pleading is likewise absolutely p:rivileged. 
It will be observed that before the defendant inter-
posed as a defense in this action his relationship of at-
torney and client to his daughter the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant at the times involved in the divorce 
proceeding acted as the legal adviser of his daughter. 
(R. 37) That after defendant filed his answer in which 
he alleged as one of his defenses to plaintiff's complaint 
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that the language complained of was absolutely privil-
eged because of the relation of attorney and client exist-
ing between defendant herein and his daughter, the plain-
tiff then in a reply denies that such relation existed be-
tween defendant and his daughter. (R. 28) This court 
is cornmitted to the view that a party may not be heard 
to thus change his position. Tebbs v. Peterson, 247 Pac. 
(2d) 897. 
POINT THREE 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATE-
MENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, 
ELLA H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE 
WITH HER TO BE PRODUCED IN HER DIVORCE PRO-
CEEDING WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS TO BE A WITNESS IN SUCH 
PROCEEDING. 
It is said in Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3 
page 233, Sec. 588 that: 
"A witness is absolutely privileged to publish 
:false and defamatory matters of another in com-
munications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding in which he is testifying if it has some 
relation thereto. * * * It is not necessary that he 
give his testimony under oath, it is enough that 
he is permitted to testify. It also protects him 
while engaged in private conference with an at-
torney at law with reference to proposed litiga-
tion, either civil or criminal." 
To the same effect is the law stated in 33 Am. Jur., 
Sec. 146, page 142 and the cases cited in the foot ndte. 
If a communication of a prospective witness had 
with a party to an action or his attorney 1nay subject the 
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party 1naking such communication liable if p·erchancc 
such statement turns out to he false, the purpose of the 
law providing for absolute privileged communication will 
have been violated. An attorney must rely upon his 
client for infor1nation as the testimony of the witnesse.-5 
who are to be used and unless the attorney is informed 
as to what a witness will testify to before he is called 
as a witness, the orderly procedure of the trial will be 
rendered impossible. 
POIN'T F'OUR 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATE-
MENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA 
H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE WITH HER 
TO BE PRODUCED IN HER DIVO·RCE PROCEEDINGS 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN WERE ABSOLUTELY 
PRIVILEGED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS 
A THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT IN SAID DIVORCE ACTION. 
Again quoting from Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, Vol 3, p;age 231, Sec. 587, it is said: 
"A party to a private litigation . . . is ab-
solutely privileged to publish false and defama-
tory matter of another in communications pre-
liminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or 
in the institution of or during the course and as 
a part of a judicial proceeding in which he parti-
ci p·ates, if the rna tter has some relation thereto. 
Comment A. The pTivilege stated in this se'Ction 
is based upon the· public interest in according to 
all persons the utmost freedom of access to the 
courts of justice for the settlement of their pri-
vate disputes. Like the privilege of an attorney, 
it is absolute." 
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In this case the defendant and his daughter were 
both parties defendant and as such had a common inter-
est in defeating plaintiff's clain1 that he had an interest 
in the apartment house, the title to which stood in their 
names. 
POINT FIVE 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOvV THAT THE AN-
SWERS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT HEREIN TO THE 
QUESTIONS ASKED I-IIM BY THE PLAINTIFF I-IEREIN 
IN TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE DEFENDANT ON 
OR ABOUT JANUARY ·9, 1954 WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVI-
LEGED BECAUSE SUCH ANSWERS WERE GIVEN IN A 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND PLAINTIFF REQUESTED 
SUCH ANSWERS. 
It will be seen that in taking defendant's deposition 
at the request of the plaintiff the following questions 
were asked defendant by plaintiff. 
''Q. Now, you have talked with Ella about the Harri-
son Avenue property that we used to own, have you not? 
A. I have. 
Q. Now in talking to her recently did you s~y that 
guy isn't honest in referring to me~ 
A. In substance, yes. (R. 21) 
Q. Du you have any proof that Ella gave me that 
money~ 
A. Except her statement. 
Q. Where are your cancelled checks~ 
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A. They are destroyed, as I told you. But I haven't 
any doubt. 
Q. You are making pretty reckless statements. 
A. I am certain as I sit here that that money went 
to pay on the Harrison Ave. property. 
Q. How much~ 
A. I don't know how much. 
Q. You don't know whether it is a fact, but you dis-
regarded that and you made such malicious statements, 
why~ 
A. I made the statement to her that if you were 
honest you would admit that she paid that money on the 
property." 
S.o far as we are able to ascertain the authorities 
are all to the effect that the answers given by the de-
fendant to the foregoing questions are ~absolutely pri-
vileged. Again quoting from Vol. 3, Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, page 233, Sec. 588, it is said: 
"The functions of witnesses is of fundamental 
importance in the administration of justice. The 
final judgment of the tribunal must be based upon 
the facts as shown by their testimony and it is 
necess-ary therefore that a full disclosure be not 
hampered by fear of private suits for defamation. 
The compulsory attendance of all witnesses in 
judicial proceedings makes the protection thus 
accorded the more n·ecessary. The witness is sub-
ject to the control of the trial judge in the exer-
cise of the privilege. For abuse of it, he may be 
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subject to criminal prosecution for perjury and 
to punishment for contempt." 
While the testiinony was not given during the trial 
of the cause the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that such testimony may, unde-r some circumstances, be 
so used. 
So also are the authorities to the effect that one 
who makes an inquiry may not he heard to complaint 
about the response given. Welcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo 
233; 110 Pac. 181; Christopher v. Akins, 214· Mass 332; 
101 N.E. 971, see also Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
Vol 3, page 220, Sec. 583 where it is said 
"Except as stated in Sec. 584, the publication 
of false and defamatory matter of another is 
absolutely privileged if the other consents there-
to." 
POINT SIX 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE STATE-
MENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED. 
The settled law in this jurisdiction is that truth 
is a defense to matters charged as being defamatory. 
Williams v. Standard Examiner Publ. Co. 83 Ut. 31; 27 
Pac. (2d) 1; D:erouviarn v. Stokes, 168 Fed (2d) 305. In 
this case the plaintiff herein was asked this question 
and gave under oath this answer in the Interrogatories 
submitted to him pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
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"Q. Is it not true that your wife, Ella H. Beezley 
paid or furnished the money to 1nake the down payment 
on the home you and she purchased in about 1934 on 
Harrison A venue¥ 
A. She didn't make the down payrnent in its entirety 
and to the best of my knowledge the down payment of 
$250.00 was split equally between myself •and my wife. 
It will be seen from the foregoing answer that if 
the plaintiff denied that his wife had made any p·ayment 
on the Harrison Avenue property, he was in error in 
making such statement. 
From what has been said the judgment of the lower 
court was right ·and should be affirmed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT' IVERSON 
.Attorney for D-efe:n:dant and 
Respon.d.ent. 
627 Cont'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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